Coalitional stochastic stability, Games & Economic Behavior (2012).
Recontracting and stochastic stability, Journal of Economic Theory (2012).
Cheap talk and editorial control, BE Journal of Theoretical Economics (2014).
A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems,
Journal of Economic Theory (2015), lead article. Coauthored with Ryoji Sawa.
Coalitions, tipping points and the speed of evolution,
Journal of Economic Theory (2015). Coauthored with Simon Angus.
Is it a norm to favour your own group, Experimental Economics (2015).
Coauthored with D.Harris, B.Herrmann, A.Kontoleon.
Stochastic stability on general state spaces, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2015).
Emergence of shared intentionality is coupled to the advance of cumulative culture, PLOS – Computational Biology (2015). Coauthored with Simon Angus.
Stochastic stability in assignment problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2016). Coauthored with Bettina Klaus.
Payoff dependent dynamics and coordination games, Economic Theory (2017). Coauthored with Sung-Ha Hwang.
The preferences of Homo Moralis are unstable under evolving assortativity, International Journal of Game Theory (2017).
Shared intentions: the evolution of collaboration, Games & Economic Behavior (2017).
Heterogeneity in preferences and behavior in threshold models, Journal of Mechanism & Institution Design (2017). Coauthored with Philip Neary.
Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: equality without symmetry, Games & Economic Behavior (2018). Coauthored with Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary.
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance, Games (2018).
Agency Equilibrium, Games (2019).
Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run, Games & Economic Behavior (2019). Coauthored with Heinrich Nax.
Watercooler chat, organizational structure and corporate culture, Games & Economic Behavior (2019). Coauthored with Andrew Wait, Simon Angus.
Agency, potential and contagion, Games & Economic Behavior (2020). Coauthored with Damian Sercombe.
Collaboration leads to cooperation on sparse networks, PLOS – Computational Biology (2020). Coauthored with Simon Angus.
Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching, Games & Economic Behavior (2020). Coauthored with Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli.
When does ambiguity fade away?, Economics Letters (2020). Coauthored with Filippo Massari.
Conventions under heterogeneous behavioral rules, Review of Economic Studies (2021). [Supplementary appendices]
Maximality in the farsighted stable set revisited, published as Corrigendum to maximality in the farsighted stable set, Econometrica (2021).
Geographic diversity in economic publishing, Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization (2021). Coauthored with Simon Angus, Kadir Atalay, David Ubilava.
Stochastic dynamics and Edmonds’ algorithm, Journal of Dynamics & Games (2022). Coauthored with William Sandholm.
Deep and shallow thinking in the long run, Theoretical Economics (2022). Coauthored with Heinrich Nax.
Reviews for American Mathematical Society
The spread of cooperative strategies on grids with random asynchronous updating, Internet Math (2017), Duffy & Jannsen.
College admissions with entrance exams: centralized versus decentralized, Journal of Economic Theory (2018), Hafalir, Hakimov, Kubler & Kurino.
Mutually best matches, Mathematical Social Sciences (2018), Salonen & Salonen.
Finding a stable matching under type specific minimum quotas, Journal of Economic Theory (2018), Tomoeda.
Strategy-proofness of worker-optimal matching with continuously transferable utility, Games & Economic Behavior (2018), Jagadeesan, Kominers & Rheingans-Yoo.
Gaming the deferred acceptance when message spaces are restricted, Mathematical Social Sciences (2018), Marutani.
Stable matching in large economies, Econometrica (2019), Che, Kim & Kojima.
A necessary and sufficient condition for uniqueness consistency in the stable marriage matching problem, Economics Letters (2019), Karpov.
Two problems in max-size popular matchings, Algorithmica (2019), Brandl & Kavitha.
The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2-games with imperfect recognition of types, Games & Economic Behavior (2019), Rusch.
Sequential versus simultaneous assignment systems and two applications, Economic Theory (2019), Dur & Kesten.
The core of roommate problems: size and rank fairness within matched pairs, International Journal of Game Theory (2019), Jaramillo, Kayi & Klijn.
Dynamic matching pennies on networks, International Journal of Game Theory (2019), Cao, Qin, Yang & Zhang.
School choice under partial fairness, Theoretical Economics (2019), Dur, Gitmez & Yilmaz.
Maximality in the farsighted stable set, Econometrica (2019), Ray & Vohra.
Bounding the cop number of a graph by its genus, Acta Mathematica Universitatis Comenianae (2019), Bowder, Erde, Lehner & Pitz.
Convergence in games with continua of equilibria, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2020), Bervoets & Faure.
Cops and robbers on graphs of bounded diameter, SIAM Journal of Discrete Mathematics (2020), Hosseini, Knox & Mohar.
The hat guessing number of graphs, Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B (2020), Alon, Ben-Eliezer, Shangguan & Tamo.
Fashion game on graphs, Discrete Optimization (2020), Shen & Lin.
Constrained stability in two-sided matching markets, Social Choice & Welfare (2020), Afacan & Dur.
Game theoretical modelling of a dynamically evolving network II: target sequences of score, Journal of Dynamics & Games (2020), Cannings & Broom.
Peg solitaire on Crtesian products of graphs, Graphs Combin. (2021), Kreh & De Wiljes.
A bargaining set for roommate problems, Journal of Mathematical Economics (2021), Atay, Mauleon & Vannetelbosch.
Maker-breaker percolation games II: escaping to infinity, Journal of Combinatorial Theory, Series B (2021), Day & Falgas-Ravry.
Connector-breaker games on random boards, The Electronic Journal of Combinatorics (2021), Clemens, Kirsch & Mogge.
Pairwise stable matching in large economies, Econometrica (2021), Greinecker & Kah.
Cautious farsighted stability in network formation games with streams of payoffs, International Journal of Game Theory (2021), Teteryatnikova.
Speed limits, Economics Letters (2022), Jelnov & Klunover.
Games on signed graphs, Automatica (2022), Li & Morse.
Hat guessing on books and windmills, Electronic Journal of Combinatorics (2022), He, Ido & Przybocki.
Learning and equilibrium in misspecified models. Coauthored with Filippo Massari.
What should economic agents learn in misspecified environments? Coauthored with Filippo Massari.
Combining strictly asymmetric choice rules.