



Reading list

Evolutionary Nash program

This list is intended as a sample and is in no way whatsoever intended to be exhaustive! It has a bias towards relatively recent work, from which an interested reader can work backwards.

Matching with non-transferable utility

- [1] Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli, and Jonathan Newton. Evolution and rawlsian social choice in matching. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 123:68–80, 2020.
- [2] Jonathan Newton and Ryoji Sawa. A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 157(0):1 – 27, 2015.
- [3] Matthew O. Jackson and Alison Watts. The evolution of social and economic networks. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 106(2):265–295, October 2002.

Matching with transferable utility

- [4] Heinrich H. Nax and Bary S. R. Pradelski. Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games. *International Journal of Game Theory*, 44(4):903–932, 2015.
- [5] Bettina Klaus and Jonathan Newton. Stochastic stability in assignment problems. *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 62:62–74, 2016.

Bargaining solutions

- [6] Sung-Ha Hwang, Wooyoung Lim, Philip Neary, and Jonathan Newton. Conventional contracts, intentional behavior and logit choice: Equality without symmetry. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 110:273–294, 2018.
- [7] Suresh Naidu, Sung-Ha Hwang, and Samuel Bowles. Evolutionary bargaining with intentional idiosyncratic play. *Economics Letters*, 109(1):31–33, 2010.
- [8] H. Peyton Young. Conventional contracts. *Review of Economic Studies*, 65:773–792, 1998.

Recontracting in general cooperative games

- [9] Jonathan Newton. Recontracting and stochastic stability in cooperative games. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 147(1):364–381, 2012.
- [10] Murali Agastya. Perturbed adaptive dynamics in coalition form games. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 89(2):207–233, 1999.
- [11] Murali Agastya. Adaptive play in multiplayer bargaining situations. *The Review of Economic Studies*, 64(3):411–426, 1997.
- [12] H. Peyton Young. An evolutionary model of bargaining. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 59:145–168, 1993.

- [13] Roberto Serrano and Oscar Volij. Mistakes in cooperation: the stochastic stability of Edgeworth's recontracting. *The Economic Journal*, 118(532):1719–1741, 2008.

Evolution of coalitional behavior

- [14] Hannes Rusch. The evolution of collaboration in symmetric 2×2 -games with imperfect recognition of types. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 114:118–127, 2019.
- [15] Jonathan Newton. Shared intentions: The evolution of collaboration. *Games and Economic Behavior*, 104:517–534, 2017.
- [16] Simon D Angus and Jonathan Newton. Emergence of shared intentionality is coupled to the advance of cumulative culture. *PLOS Computational Biology*, 11(10):e1004587, 2015.